Abstract. We show that the Feistel construction with six rounds and random round functions is publicly indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation (a result that is not known to hold for full indifferentiability). Public indifferentiability (pub-indifferentiability for short) is a variant of indifferentiability introduced by Yoneyama et al. [YMO09] and Dodis et al. [DRS09] where the simulator knows all queries made by the distinguisher to the primitive it tries to simulate, and is useful to argue the security of cryptosystems where all the queries to the ideal primitive are public (as e.g. in many digital signature schemes). To prove the result, we introduce a new and simpler variant of indifferentiability, that we call sequential indifferentiability (seq-indifferentiability for short) and show that this notion is in fact equivalent to pub-indifferentiability for stateless ideal primitives. We then prove that the 6-round Feistel construction is seq-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. We also observe that sequential indifferentiability implies correlation intractability, so that the Feistel construction with six rounds and random round functions yields a correlation intractable invertible permutation, a notion we define analogously to correlation intractable functions introduced by Canetti et al. [CGH98].
Introduction
Indifferentiability. Indifferentiability has been introduced by Maurer et al. [MRH04] as a generalization of the concept of indistinguishability for systems using public components (i.e. components that can be queried by any party including the adversary). This framework has since then gained much popularity, and starting with [CDMP05] it has been widely used to analyze hash functions built from a smaller ideal primitive, e.g. a fixed input-length (FIL) random compression function or an ideal block cipher [BR06, BDPA08, CLNY06, CN08, DRRS09, FLP08, HPY07, MT07] . Informally, a construction C using an ideal primitive F (e.g. a hash function based on a FIL random compression function) is said to be indifferentiable from another ideal primitive G (e.g. a random oracle) if there exists a simulator S accessing G such that the two systems (G, S G ) and (C F , F ) are indistinguishable. Roughly, the goal of the simulator is twofold: it must provide answers that are consistent with G, without deviating too much from the distribution of answers of F . Indifferentiability allows modular proofs of security in idealized models in the sense that if a construction C F is indifferentiable from an ideal primitive G, then any cryptosystem proven secure when used with G remains secure when used with the construction C F . 4 For example, if a cryptosystem is secure in the random oracle model, and some hash function construction H f based on a FIL random compression function f is indifferentiable from a random oracle, then the cryptosystem is still secure when used with H f . More interestingly from a theoretical point of view, Coron et al. [CDMP05] showed that a number of variants of the Merkle-Damgård construction [Dam89, Mer89] , used with an ideal cipher in Davies-Meyer mode [PGV93, BRS02] , are indifferentiable from a random oracle. This implies that any functionality that can be securely implemented in the random oracle model can also be securely realized in the ideal cipher model.
The Feistel construction with public round functions. The Feistel construction turns a function
F from n-bit strings to n-bit strings into an (efficiently invertible) permutation on 2n-bit strings. It is computed as Ψ F (L, R) = (R, L ⊕ F (R) ) . In their seminal paper [LR88] which triggered a lot of subsequent work [Mau92,NR99,Pat90,Pat91,Pat98,Pat03,Pat04,Vau03], Luby and Rackoff showed that three (resp. four) rounds of the Feistel construction, with independent pseudorandom functions in each round, yields a pseudorandom permutation (resp. strong pseudorandom permutation). The core of this result is in fact purely information-theoretic [Mau92] , meaning that the Feistel construction with three (resp. four) rounds and random round functions is indistinguishable from a random permutation (resp. an invertible random permutation) by any computationally unbounded distinguisher limited to a polynomial number of oracle queries. The Luby-Rackoff theorem crucially relies on the secrecy of the round functions. A few papers studied what happens when the round functions are made public. In particular, Ramzan and Reyzin [RR00] have shown that the Feistel construction with four rounds remains strongly pseudorandom even when the distinguisher has oracle access to the two middle round functions (but not to the first or the fourth round function). Dodis and Puniya [DP07] have studied various properties of the Feistel construction (unpredictability, pseudorandomness) when all intermediate round values of the Feistel computation are leaked to the adversary and shown that in that case a super-logarithmic number of rounds was necessary and sufficient for the property to be inherited by the Feistel construction from the round functions.
Indifferentiability of the Feistel construction.
As already mentioned, it is possible to securely instantiate a random oracle in the ideal cipher model. A natural question is whether the other direction holds, namely whether there is a construction using a random oracle that securely implements a random invertible permutation. 5 Given its numerous cryptographic properties, the Feistel construction (with public random round functions) appears as an obvious candidate for this task. Again, this question can be rigorously formulated in the indifferentiability framework: namely, is the Feistel construction with sufficiently many rounds, and public random round functions, indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation? Dodis and Puniya [DP06] considered the problem in the so-called honest-but-curious model, where the distinguisher only sees the queries made by the Feistel construction to the random round functions, but is not allowed to make arbitrary queries to the round functions. In this setting, they showed that a super-logarithmic number of rounds is sufficient to securely realize a random invertible permutation. However, since full indifferentiability is not implied in general by indifferentiability in the honest-but-curious model (these two notions are in fact incomparable [CPS08] ), they were not able to conclude in the general setting. Coron, Patarin, and Seurin [CPS08] gave a first proof that the Feistel construction with six rounds is indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. The proof was rather involved, and Künzler [Kün09] later found a distinguishing attack against the simulator given in [CPS08] , therefore invalidating the indifferentiability proof. 6 Only recently, Holenstein et al. [HKT11] gave a new proof that the Feistel construction with fourteen rounds is indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation, which was inspired from a previous proof for ten rounds that appeared in the PhD thesis of Seurin [Seu09] but had some gaps.
Public indifferentiability. Yoneyama et al. [YMO09] and Dodis et al. [DRS09] independently realized that indifferentiability was sometimes stronger than needed to argue security of cryptosystems. In particular, when all queries made to the ideal primitive are public (like in many digital signature schemes such as FDH [BR93] , probabilistic FDH [Cor02] , PSS [BR96] . . . , where all queries to the hash function can be revealed to the attacker without affecting the security), the weaker notion of public indifferentiability is sufficient. [YMO09, DRS09] were both concerned with indifferentiability from a random oracle and respectively called this notion leaky random oracle and public-use random oracle. Public indifferentiability is defined similarly to indifferentiability, but the task of the simulator is made easier by letting it know all queries made by the distinguisher to the ideal primitive G.
Correlation intractability. Correlation intractability was introduced by Canetti et al. [CGH98] as an attempt to capture as many security properties of the random oracle as possible. A family of functions is said to be correlation intractable if for a random function of the family it is hard to find a sequence of inputs that together with their image satisfy a relation that would be hard to satisfy for a uniformly random function (a so-called evasive relation). Correlation intractability in particular implies collision resistance, pre-image resistance and many other security properties usually required for cryptographic hash functions. Unfortunately, Canetti et al. also showed that in the standard model, no correlation intractable hash function family exists. A consequence of this non-existence result is that there are cryptosystems that are secure in the random oracle model, but insecure when the random oracle is instantiated by any function family. Though correlation intractability was primarily defined in the standard model, it is easily transposable to idealized models. As we will see our result establishes a connection between correlation intractability and public indifferentiability.
Contributions of this work.
We define a new and weaker notion of indifferentiability that we call sequential indifferentiability (seq-indifferentiability for short). This new definition only restricts the order in which the distinguisher can query the two oracles it is granted access to: it can first query the primitive F (or the simulator S), and then the construction C F (or the ideal primitive G), but not F /S again. We show that when the ideal primitive G is stateless (which is the most usual case), this notion is equivalent to public indifferentiability introduced by [DRS09, YMO09] where all queries to the primitive G are public. However the seq-indifferentiability notion has the advantage of being simpler and easier to use in proofs. This simple restriction on the queries of the distinguisher enables to give a relatively simple proof that the 6-round Feistel construction with random round functions is seq-indifferentiable (and hence also publicly indifferentiable) from a random invertible permutation, a result whose analogue for full indifferentiability seems out of reach at the moment. Our result in particular implies that any scheme proven secure in the random invertible permutation model or the ideal cipher model and where all queries to the ideal primitive can be made public without affecting the security (e.g. signature schemes like OPSSR [Gra02] and subsequent variants [KW03, CMPP05] ) remains secure in the random oracle model when using a 6-round Feistel construction (while the best generic replacement previously to our work was the 14-round Feistel construction [HKT11] ).
Though weaker than full indifferentiability, we also show that seq-indifferentiability is still sufficiently strong to imply correlation intractability. In particular, our result shows that the 6-round Feistel construction with random round functions yields a correlation intractable invertible permutation (we note that previous observations [CPS08] already implied that the 5-round Feistel construction fails to provide a correlation intractable invertible permutation). We discuss the implications of this result for chosen-key and known-key attacks on block ciphers [KR07] .
On a slightly different topic, we also analyze the Feistel-like domain extension construction for ideal ciphers proposed by Coron et al. [CDMS10] and show that in the seq-indifferentiability model one can obtain a security bound beyond the birthday barrier.
Open problems.
The most challenging open question is of course whether the 6-round Feistel construction is fully indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation, and if not, what is the minimal number of rounds needed to achieve this property. We hope that our result will constitute a first step towards a finer understanding of this question. In particular, our result implies that if the 6-round Feistel construction is not fully indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation, then this cannot be shown by proving that it is not correlation intractable as was done for five rounds. Another interesting problem is to weaken the assumptions on the round functions and see which property would continue to hold: e.g. is the 6-round Feistel construction with correlation intractable round functions still a correlation intractable invertible permutation? A related question is whether our result could be a first step towards proposing plausible constructions of (restricted) correlation intractable function families in the standard model, a question left open by [CGH98, Section 5.1].
Organization. In Section 2, we start by giving the definition of sequential indifferentiability and prove that it is equivalent to public indifferentiability for stateless ideal primitives. In Section 3, we prove the main result of this paper, namely that the 6-round Feistel construction is sequentially (and hence publicly) indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. In Section 4, we apply this result to prove the correlation intractability of the 6-round Feistel construction.
Preliminaries

Notations and Definitions
Notations. [i.
.j] will denote the set of integers k such that i ≤ k ≤ j. We will use n to denote the security parameter, and in sections dealing with the Feistel construction we will identify n with the input and output length of the round functions. We will write f ∈ poly(n) to denote a polynomially bounded function and f ∈ negl(n) to denote a negligible function. When X is a non-empty finite set, we write x ← R X to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from X and assigned to x. PPT will stand for probabilistic polynomial-time, and ITM for interactive Turing machine.
Ideal primitives. Given two sets Dom ⊂ {0, 1}
* and Rng ⊂ {0, 1} * , we denote F(Dom, Rng) the set of all functions from Dom to Rng. A primitive G is a sequence G = (Dom n , Rng n , G n ) n∈N where G n ⊂ F(Dom n , Rng n ). The ideal primitive G associated with G is the sequence of random variables (G n ) n∈N where G n is uniformly distributed over G n . We will often adopt the lazy sampling view [BR06] to describe ideal primitives queried as oracles.
A random function F = (F n ) n∈N is the ideal primitive associated to the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . Queried as an oracle it returns a uniformly random string in {0, 1} n if x was never queried, or the same answer as before if x was previously queried.
A random invertible permutation P = (P n ) n∈N is the ideal primitive associated with the sequence P = (Dom n , Rng n , P n ) n∈N where Dom n = {0, 1} × {0, 1} n , Rng n = {0, 1} n , and P n is the set of functions P such that x → P (0, x) is a permutation of {0, 1} n , and y → P (1, y) its inverse. Queries of the form (0, x) and (1, y) will be called respectively forward and backward queries. In the lazy sampling point of view, P n keeps two lists L x and L y of forward and backward queries whose image is already defined together with an invertible mapping from L x to L y . Upon receiving a forward query (0, x) such that x / ∈ L x it returns an answer y uniformly random over {0, 1} n \ L y , and adds x to L x and y to L y and updates the mapping (and reciprocally for a backward query (1, y) ). Later, we will occasionally refer to L x and L y as the history of the random invertible permutation. An ideal cipher E = (E n ) takes an additional input, the key, of length (n), and for each key k ∈ {0, 1} (n) , E n (k, ·) is an independent random invertible permutation over {0, 1} n . A two-sided random function on {0, 1} n , denoted R n , is very similar to a random invertible permutation. It also keeps to lists L x and L y together with an invertible mapping from L x to L y . However when receiving a forward query (0, x) such that x / ∈ L x or a backward query (1, y) such that y / ∈ L y , it returns a uniformly random answer in {0, 1}
n . In case a collision happens, the previous image or pre-image is removed from L y or L x and the mapping is updated accordingly. Note that a two-sided random function is stateful: it may return different answers to the same query (however at any time it defines an invertible mapping from L x to L y ). A two-sided random function is statistically indistinguishable from a random invertible permutation: the so called PRF/PRP switching lemma [BR06] establishes 7 that an oracle machine making at most q oracle queries can distinguish P n from R n with advantage at most q 2 /2 n+1 . In the following, we omit the subscripts when the domain and the range of an ideal primitive are clear from the context. A construction will simply be a Turing machine having oracle access to an ideal primitive and implementing another given primitive. The main construction we will consider in this work is the Feistel construction. The Feistel construction. Given a function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the basic (1-round) Feistel construction is the permutation on {0,
(Here L, R, S, and T are n-bit strings). The k-round Feistel construction associated to round functions (F 1 , . . . , F k ) takes inputs x ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} 2n and is defined by:
Notations used for denoting the intermediate round values for the 6-round Feistel construction are given in Figure 1 . In the following, when considering the Feistel construction using k independent random functions, we will simply note F = (F 1 , . . . , F k ) this tuple of functions and Ψ
Sequential Indifferentiability
Indifferentiability was originally formulated within the formalism of random systems [Mau02] . We adopt here the simpler formulation using interactive Turing machines as in [CDMP05] . We first recall the classical definition of indifferentiability [MRH04] . For this, we slightly change the way one usually measure the cost of queries of a distinguisher (this will make our results simpler to express). Given a distinguisher D, the total oracle queries cost of D is the number of queries received by the oracle F when D interacts with (C F , F ). Hence this is the sum of the number of direct queries of D to F and the number of queries made by C to F to answer D's queries. 
C F is simply said to be statistically and strongly indifferentiable from G if for any q ∈ poly(n), the above definition is fulfilled with σ ∈ poly(n) and ∈ negl(n).
Definition 1 does not refer to the running time of S and D. When only polynomial-time algorithms are considered, indifferentiability is said to be computational. Weak indifferentiability is defined as above, but the order of quantifiers for the distinguisher and the simulator are switched (for all distinguisher, there is a simulator. . . ). We will mainly be concerned with statistical strong indifferentiability in this work, but we note that weak indifferentiability is sufficient for our results on correlation intractability in Section 4.
In order to define our new notion of indifferentiability, we will consider a restricted class of distinguisher, called sequential distinguisher, which can only make queries in a specific order. Such a distinguisher first queries the primitive F (or the simulator S) as it wishes, and then the construction C F (or the primitive G) as it wishes, but after its first query to C F or G, it cannot query S or F again. Sequential indifferentiability (seq-indifferentiability for short) is defined relatively to such distinguishers (see also Figure 2 ). Full indifferentiability obviously implies seq-indifferentiability. Yoneyama et al. [YMO09] and Dodis et al. [DRS09] have introduced another weakened notion of indifferentiability, where the primitive G is only queried on public inputs, that we call here public indifferentiability (pub-indifferentiability for short). This can be formalized as follows: given an ideal primitive G, we define the augmented ideal primitive G as the primitive exposing two interfaces: the first (regular) one is the same as G, and the second is an interface Reveal that, when queried, returns the ordered sequence of all (regular) queries and corresponding answers made so far by any party to the regular interface. The second interface can only be used by the simulator, not by the distinguisher.
Definition 2 (Seq-indifferentiability). A construction C with oracle access to an ideal primitive
Definition 3 (Pub-indifferentiability).
A construction C with oracle access to an ideal primitive F is said to be (statistically and strongly) (q, σ, )-pub-indifferentiable from an ideal primitive G if there exists an oracle ITM S such that for any distinguisher D of total oracle queries cost at most q, S makes at most σ oracle queries, and the following holds:
As explained in [DRS09] , the composition theorem of [MRH04] still holds with pub-indifferentiability for cryptosystems where all messages queried to G can be inferred from the adversary's query during the security experiment.
Clearly, pub-indifferentiability implies seq-indifferentiability. Indeed, since after its first query to G a sequential distinguisher never queries the simulator again, the interface Reveal is of no use to the simulator. A less trivial result is that seq-indifferentiability implies pub-indifferentiability for stateless 8 ideal primitives G, thus making seq-and pub-indifferentiability equivalent notions in that case.
Theorem 1. Let C be a construction with oracle access to some ideal primitive
Proof. The proof is deferred to Appendix A for reasons of space.
Ristenpart 9 observed that the above theorem does not hold (at least in the computational setting) when G is stateful. This is explained in Appendix B. A very simple example enables to separate full indifferentiability from seq/pub-indifferentiability, namely the Merkle-Damgård construction without strengthening using a random compression function: it was proven in [CDMP05] that it is not indifferentiable from a random oracle (a consequence of length-extension attacks), and in [DRS09] that it is pub-indifferentiable from a random oracle.
Seq-Indifferentiability Beyond the Birthday Barrier for the Construction of [CDMS10]
In [CDMS10], Coron et al. considered the problem of ideal cipher domain extension. They showed that a 3-round Feistel-like construction based on an n-bit ideal cipher is indifferentiable from a 2n-bit ideal cipher. They obtained a birthday security bound, namely the construction is secure as long as the attacker makes q 2 n/2 many queries. However, in the same paper it was shown that the construction is actually secure up to q 2 n many queries in the standard indistinguishability model, where the attacker cannot make queries to the smaller n-bit ideal cipher. It was left as an open problem whether obtaining a similar improved security bound in the indifferentiability model was possible. Here we give a partial positive answer to that question, namely showing that the 3-round Feistel-like construction is seq-indifferentiable and pub-indifferentiable from an ideal cipher up to q 2 n queries. Details can be found in Appendix F.
Seq-Indifferentiability of the 6-Round Feistel Construction
In this section we prove the main result of this paper which states that the Feistel construction with 6 rounds and random round functions is seq-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation, and hence also pub-indifferentiable since a random invertible permutation is stateless. Before stating the result, we recall that in [CPS08] , it was shown that the Feistel construction with five rounds is not indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. In fact, the distinguisher they described is sequential, which implies that the 5-round Feistel construction is not even seq-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. We recall this attack in Appendix C.
Theorem 2. The Feistel construction with six rounds and random round functions is statistically and strongly (q, σ, )-seq-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation, where:
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2. We will consider a sequential distinguisher D that first issues at most q f queries to the simulator (or the random functions F i ). These queries will be called F -queries. Then, it issues at most q p queries to the random permutation P (or the Feistel construction Ψ F 6 ). These queries will be called P -queries. The total oracle queries cost is q f + 6q p (for each P -query, the Feistel construction makes 6 F -queries to compute the answer) and is assumed to be less than q.
We start by describing how the simulator S works. It maintains an history of values for which each round function has been defined (either because this value has been queried by the distinguisher, or because the simulator has set this value internally). We will note F i , i ∈ [1..6] the history of the i-th round function, that is a set of pairs (U, V ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n , where U is an input to round function F i and V is the corresponding image (which we denote F i (U ) = V ). We write U ∈ F i to denote that the image of U by F i is defined in the history. Initially round function values F i (U ) are undefined for all i ∈ [1..6] and all U ∈ {0, 1} n . The images are then modified during the execution of the simulator.
n means that the image of U by F i is set uniformly at random in {0, 1}
n . If a round function value is already in the history and a new assignment occurs, the previous value is overwritten (alternatively, we could let the simulator abort in this case, as in [CPS08] , but as we will see this happens only with negligible probability so that the exact behavior of the simulator in such a case in unessential). We will note H = (F 1 , . . . , F 6 ) the complete history of the six round functions.
When the simulator receives a F -query (i, U ) (meaning that the distinguisher asks for the image of U through round function F i ), it calls an internal procedure Query(i, U ). This procedure checks whether the corresponding image is in the history of F i , in which case it returns this value and stops. Otherwise it sets the image uniformly at random. If i = 1, 2, 5, or 6, it does nothing more. If i = 3 or 4, the simulator additionally completes all centers (Y, Z) ∈ F 3 × F 4 newly created so that the corresponding values of (L, R) and (S, T ) obtained by evaluating the Feistel construction respectively backward and forward are consistent with the random permutation P , meaning that P (0, (L, R)) = (S, T ). This is done by calling two internal procedures CompleteForward (if i = 4) or CompleteBackward (if i = 3) which "adapts" two round function values (F 5 (A) and F 6 (S) for CompleteForward, and F 1 (R) and F 2 (X) for CompleteBackward) so that the Feistel matches with the random permutation. The pseudo-code for the three procedures is given below. Statements put in boxes in CompleteForward and CompleteBackward are replacements for a different system used in the indifferentiability proof and can be ignored for the moment.
There are two points to prove in order to obtain Theorem 2: that the simulator runs in polynomial time, and then that the probabilities that the distinguisher outputs 1 when interacting with (P , S P ) and (Ψ 
Query(6, S) 34: Proof. Elements are added to the history of F 3 and F 4 only when a corresponding F -query is made to the simulator, so that the size of their history cannot be greater than q.
is called, at most once, so that in total these procedures are called at most q 2 times. Since the simulator makes one query to the random permutation per execution of CompleteForward and CompleteBackward this in turns implies that the total number of queries to P is at most q 2 . Finally, elements are added to the history of F 1 , F 2 , F 5 and F 6 either when a query is made to the simulator, or during an execution of CompleteForward or CompleteBackward, so that the size of their history cannot be greater than q 2 + q.
In order to prove that the two systems Σ 1 = (P , S P ) and Σ 4 = (Ψ F 6 , F ) are indistinguishable, we will use two intermediate systems:
where the P -queries of D are answered by the Feistel construction asking round function values to the simulator, which itself interacts with P , and
where the random invertible permutation is replaced by a two-sided random function R (note the corresponding change in procedures CompleteForward and CompleteBackward indicated by a boxed statement). The four systems used in the proof are depicted in Figure 3 .
The main part of the analysis is concerned with systems Σ 2 and Σ 3 . We will show that unless some bad event happens, the round function values set by the simulator in Σ 2 are consistent with P (which will enable to bound the statistical distance between Σ 1 and Σ 2 ) , and that in Σ 3 they are uniformly random and independent (which will enable to bound the statistical distance between Σ 3 and Σ 4 ). In systems Σ 2 and Σ 3 , the simulator first receives at most q f queries from the distinguisher, and then at most 6q p queries from the Feistel construction (6 for each P -query of the distinguisher). Hence the total number of queries received by the simulator is exactly the total oracle queries cost of D, which is less than q. The statistical distance between answers of systems Σ 2 and Σ 3 is easily bounded.
Lemma 2. For any distinguisher of total oracle queries cost at most q, the following holds:
Proof. Consider the union of D, Ψ 6 , and S as a single distinguisher D interacting either with a random invertible permutation or a two-sided random function. Note that D makes at most q 2 queries to its oracle (Lemma 1). One can conclude thanks to the PRF/PRP switching lemma [BR06] .
Before going further with the proof, we define formally what it means for an input x ∈ {0, 1}×{0, 1} n to the Feistel construction to be computable with respect to the history of the simulator. 7] is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Computable input). Given a simulator history H and an input
An input x is said to be computable with respect to [6] , ρ H (x) [7] ) if x is a forward input and Ψ
For a computable input x, we will often use the notation (L, R, X, Y, Z, A, S, T ) = ρ H (x) as depicted on Figure 1 .
We now define a bad event that may occur during the execution of the simulator (in Σ 2 or Σ 3 ) in relation with Lines 26, 27, 37, and 38 of the simulator. We will say that event Bad happens if in any execution of CompleteForward or CompleteBackward, the input value whose image is set at Lines 26, 27, 37 or 38 is already in the history of the corresponding round function. This implies that the simulator overwrites a value so that its answers may not be coherent with P or R any more.
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Reciprocally, if Bad does not happen, then the simulator never overwrites any value in its history.
We start with the simple observation that if Bad does not happen, then during any execution of CompleteForward or CompleteBackward, the query to P or R made by the simulator is fresh.
Lemma 3. In system Σ 2 , if Bad does not happen, then in any execution of CompleteForward or
CompleteBackward the query to P made by the simulator is not in the history of P . For system Σ 3 , the corresponding statement holds for R.
Proof. The reasoning is the same for Σ 2 and Σ 3 , we use Σ 2 to fix ideas. Consider an execution of CompleteForward(Y, Z). Let x = (0, (L, R)) be the query to P made by the simulator, and (S, T ) = P (x). If x is already in the history of P , then it was necessarily added by a previous execution of CompleteForward(Y , Z ) or CompleteBackward(Y , Z ) (note that the distinguisher does not make any query to P in Σ 2 or to R in Σ 3 ). But since Bad does not happen, round function values are never overwritten so that necessarily (Y , Z ) = (Y, Z). This is impossible since by construction the simulator makes at most one call to CompleteForward or CompleteBackward per center (Y, Z) ∈ F 3 × F 4 .
We are now ready to upper bound the probability that Bad happens in Σ 2 or Σ 3 . 
4 /2 n in Σ 3 . The absolute difference between the probability that Bad happens in Σ 2 and Σ 3 cannot be greater than the statistical distance between answers of P and R, hence the probability that Bad happens in Σ 2 is less than 4q
The following lemma says that as long as Bad does not happen in Σ 2 , the round function values set by the simulator are consistent with P . A direct consequence of this lemma is that as long as Bad does not happen in Σ 2 , the answers of systems Σ 1 and Σ 2 are identically distributed.
Lemma 6. For any distinguisher of total oracle queries cost at most q, the following holds:
Proof. Clearly, answers to F -queries of the distinguisher are identically distributed in Σ 1 and Σ 2 since they are answered by S P in both systems (may Bad occur or not). 11 Moreover, in Σ 2 any P -query x asked by the distinguisher is computable with respect to the history of the simulator at the time it is answered by Ψ 6 , and if Bad does not happen in Σ 2 , then according to Lemma 5, Ψ H 6 (x) = P (x) so that answers to P -queries of the distinguisher are also identically distributed in both systems. The result follows from Lemma 4. Proof. Since this is clear for round function values set uniformly at random (independently of Bad occurring or not), we only have to examine values that are adapted at Lines 26, 27, 37, and 38 of the simulator. But according to Lemma 3, if Bad does not happen, the query to R made by the distinguisher in any execution of CompleteForward or CompleteBackward is not in the history of R, so that the answer (S, T ) or (L, R) is uniformly random. Consequently, round function values set by This lemma finally enables to bound the statistical distance between the answers of Σ 3 and Σ 4 .
Lemma 8. For any distinguisher of total oracle queries cost at most q, the following holds:
Proof. If Bad does not occur in Σ 3 then answers of S R are distributed exactly as answers of F according to Lemma 7. Hence the statistical distance between answers of Σ 3 and Σ 4 is upper bounded by the probability that Bad happens in Σ 3 , given by Lemma 4.
Theorem 2 is now a simple consequence of Lemmata 2, 6, and 8.
Remark 1.
The strategy of using the intermediate system Σ 2 is likely to be quite generic for seq-indifferentiability proofs (system Σ 3 , on the contrary, is quite specific to the Feistel construction). We believe this could probably make proofs of pub-indifferentiability (e.g. [DRS09, Section 7]) much easier, but leave this for future work.
Remark 2.
Note that for general distinguishers (not necessarily sequential), the proof would go through exactly as above for Lemmata 2 and 8. The problematic step is clearly going from Σ 1 to Σ 2 . To see what could go wrong if the distinguisher can interleave queries to P and S, consider the following simple example. D first makes a P -query P (0, (L, R)) = (S, T ), and then makes the sequence of Fqueries F 1 (R), F 2 (X), F 6 (S), F 5 (A). In system Σ 1 , the simulator returns uniformly answers to the four F -queries and will be unable to adapt F 3 and F 4 , whereas in Σ 2 the initial P -query of the distinguisher will trigger six F -queries from Ψ 6 which will lead the simulator to adapt the chain when query F 4 (Y ) occurs. Making progress towards proving full indifferentiability for six rounds clearly requires to find the right way to deal with these "external" chains without knowing the P -queries of the distinguisher.
Applications to Correlation Intractability
Correlation intractability was introduced by Canetti et al. in their work on the limits of the random oracle methodology [CGH98] . In the standard model, a function family is said to be correlation intractable if given the description of a random function f of the family, no PPT algorithm can find an input x, or more generally a sequence of inputs (x 1 , . . . , x m ), such that ((x 1 , . . . , x m ), (f (x 1 ), . . . , f (x m ))) satisfies a relation that would be hard to satisfy for a uniformly random function.
There is no difficulty in extending the definition of correlation intractability to an idealized model: instead of passing the description of the function as input to the algorithm, it is granted access to the ideal primitive used by the construction C. This way one can define a correlation intractable construction (accessing an ideal primitive).
In all the following, we will consider relations over pairs of binary sequences (formally, a subset of {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * ). We assume that the machine M returns sequences of strings in Dom n , the domain of the ideal primitive G n or the construction C Fn .
Definition 5 (Evasive relation). Let G = (G n ) be an ideal primitive associated to G = (Dom n , Rng n , G n ). A relation R over pairs of binary sequences is said to be evasive with respect to G if for any PPT oracle machine M, there is a negligible function such that the following holds:
Example 1. The relation over pairs of quadruplets of binary strings
is evasive for a random invertible permutation. This is exactly the evasive relation used in Appendix C to show that the 5-round Feistel construction is not seq-indifferentiable from a random permutation. This same attack also shows that the 5-round Feistel construction is not correlation intractable.
Definition 6 (Correlation intractable construction). Let C be a construction with oracle access to an ideal primitive F = (F n ) and implementing some primitive G. C F is said to be (multiple-output) correlation intractable if for any relation R over pairs of binary sequences evasive with respect to G, and any PPT oracle machine M, there is a negligible function such that:
Weak correlation intractability is defined similarly as above by quantifying only over all polynomialtime recognizable relations (i.e. relations R such that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given ((x 1 , . . . , x m ), (y 1 , . . . , y m )), decides whether it belongs to R or not).
Theorem 3. Let C be a construction with oracle access to an ideal primitive F = (F n ) and implementing some primitive G. If C F is statistically (resp. computationally) seq-indifferentiable from the ideal primitive G, then C F is correlation intractable (resp. weakly correlation intractable).
Proof. Assume that C F is not correlation intractable. Then there is an evasive relation R and a PPT oracle machine M such that M Fn (1 n ) outputs with non-negligible probability δ a sequence ((x 1 , . . . , x m ), (G(x 1 ), . . . , G(x m )) ) ∈ R. If this is the case it returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
When the distinguisher is interacting with (C F , F ), the probability that it returns 1 is exactly δ, which is non-negligible by hypothesis. On the contrary, when it interacts with (G, S G ), then the union of M and S is a PPT oracle machine with oracle access to G, so that by definition of an evasive relation D outputs 1 only with negligible probability. The advantage of the distinguisher is non-negligible, which contradicts the seq-indifferentiability of C F .
A direct consequence of Theorems 2 and 3 is that the 6-round Feistel construction with random round functions is correlation intractable: no polynomial algorithm with oracle access to the round functions can find a sequence of inputs that together with their image by the Feistel satisfy a relation that would be hard to satisfy in the random invertible permutation model. Note that the sole existence of correlation intractable invertible permutations in the random oracle model was already implied by the result of Holenstein et al. [HKT11] on the full indifferentiability of the 14-round Feistel construction (since full indifferentiability implies seq-indifferentiability and hence correlation intractability), but our results shows that six rounds are sufficient to achieve this property.
Remark 3. According to Theorem 3, sequential indifferentiability implies correlation intractability. However correlation intractability does not necessarily imply sequential indifferentiability. In Appendix D we provide a simple counter-example separating the two notions.
Implications for Chosen-Key and Known-Key Attacks on Block Ciphers. Knudsen and Rijmen [KR07] have introduced so-called known-key attacks on block ciphers. We discuss the implications of our results regarding this attack model in Appendix E.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that C F is strongly (2q, σ, )-seq-indifferentiable from G, and let S seq be the simulator for seq-indifferentiability. We define a simulator S pub for pub-indifferentiability as follows. S pub runs S seq , transparently relaying queries of S seq to G to the regular interface of G. Each time S pub receives a Fquery y from the distinguisher, it makes a call to Reveal, getting a sequence (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of G-queries that have been made by the distinguisher so far (S pub considers only fresh G-queries, i.e. G-queries that have not been returned by a previous query to Reveal). For each i = 1 to m, S pub makes all F -queries needed to compute C F (x i ) to S seq . Finally, it makes the F -query y to S seq and returns the corresponding answer.
Let D pub be a distinguisher for the pub-indifferentiability game of total oracle queries cost at most q. We have to bound the absolute difference between the probabilities that D pub outputs 1 when interacting with (G, S G pub ) and (C F , F ). For this, we assume wlog that
We consider the following sequential distinguisher D seq interacting with a pair of oracles (G, F ) which can be either (G, S G seq ) or (C F , F ). D seq runs D pub (see Figure 4) . D seq simply relays any F -query of D pub to its own F oracle, returning the corresponding answer. When D pub makes a G-query x, D seq makes all the necessary F -queries to its own F -oracle to compute C F (x) and returns this value as the answer to D pub . Once D pub has returned 0 or 1, D seq makes all the G-queries that have been made by D pub to its own G-oracle and checks whether all the answers it has given to D pub (by computing C F with its own F -oracle) correspond (in which case we say that event check happens). If this is the case, D seq returns the same answer as S pub . Otherwise it returns 1. Note that D seq is indeed sequential, and that its total oracle queries cost is less than 2q when D pub 's total oracle queries cost is less than q.
First, it is straightforward to verify that when D seq interacts with (C F , F ), check happens with probability one so that Pr D
When D seq interacts with (G, S G seq ), one can write:
Note that when event check occurs, all answers to F -and G-queries of D pub have been answered as if D pub had been interacting directly with (G, S G pub ). This follows from the definition of S pub and the fact that G is stateless. The statelessness of G is crucial here since even when check happens, the sequence of queries to G when D seq interacts with (G, S 
It follows from assumption (1) that
which is less than since by hypothesis C F is (2q, σ, )-seq-indifferentiable from G. The result follows by noting that S pub makes at most q Reveal queries and σ queries to G.
Clearly, S pub and D pub are polynomial-time if S seq and D seq are, so that pub-indifferentiability holds computationally if seq-indifferentiability does.
B Counter-Example to Theorem 1 for Stateful Ideal Primitives
When the ideal primitive G is stateful, then seq-indifferentiability does not necessarily imply pubindifferentiability in the computational setting, as was observed by Ristenpart. To see this, let E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme. The ideal primitive G maintains a hashtable T with n-bit keys and takes as input an n-bit string x and a public key pk for E.
1: procedure G(x,pk) 2: if T (x) = ⊥ then 3:
T (x) := Enc pk (y)
5:
end if 6: return T (x) 7: end procedure The construction C is quite similar to G, but instead of drawing a uniformly random y it uses a random function oracle F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n :
if T (x) = ⊥ then 3:
end if 6: return T (x) 7: end procedure One can show that C F is strongly, computationally seq-indifferentiable from G, but not pubindifferentiable. The idea is that in the seq-indifferentiability game, the simulator can always get the y values drawn by G by generating the public keys by itself, whereas in the pub-indifferentiability game, when the distinguisher makes a G-query before the simulator, the y value will be hidden to S pub unless it can break the one-wayness of E. The seq-indifferentiability simulator maintains an history F for the simulated oracle and is defined as follows:
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 n )
4:
c := G(x, pk)
5:
y := Dec sk (c) 6 :
end if
return F (x) 9: end procedure It is not very hard to see that the above simulator works for seq-indifferentiability. On the other hand, consider the following distinguisher for pub-indifferentiability:
3:
c := Θ 1 (0, pk)
4:
y := Dec sk (c) 5 :
if y = y then When (Θ 1 , Θ 2 ) = (C F , F ) then D pub always returns 1. However any efficient simulator S pub such that D pub returns 1 with non negligible probability when (Θ 1 , Θ 2 ) = (G, S G pub ) can be turned into an algorithm breaking the one-wayness of E. Hence D pub distinguishes the two systems with overwhelming probability.
C Sequential Distinguisher for the 5-Round Feistel Construction
The sequential distinguisher D proceeds as follows (see Figure 5) 
Notations are chosen such that input round values sharing a common index correspond to the same input-output pair of the Feistel scheme: we say they constitute a chain. For example, (X 12 , Y 14 , Z 13 ) constitute a chain since X 12 = Z 13 ⊕ F 3 (Y 14 ). The distinguisher then queries F 2 (X 12 ) and F 2 (X 34 ) and computes:
, and F 1 (R 4 ) and computes:
Finally the distinguisher makes the P -queries (S 1 , T 1 
it returns 1, otherwise it returns 0. Note that this distinguisher is sequential.
First, one can easily verify that D always returns 1 when it interacts with (Ψ
, so that Z 24 is also the input value to F 4 associated with (L 4 , R 4 ). It follows that:
and the relation S 1 ⊕ S 2 ⊕ S 3 ⊕ S 4 = 0 is always verified. On the contrary, when interacting with (P , S P ), it returns 1 only with negligible probability. Indeed, considering the union of D and S as a single machine making a polynomial number of queries to the random permutation P , it can find four input/output pairs (
0 only with negligible probability. 
D Separating Correlation Intractability and Sequential Indifferentiability
According to Theorem 3, sequential indifferentiability implies correlation intractability. However, it does not hold the other way around. Below we give a constructive counter-example.
Let C E be a construction based on some ideal primitive E which is seq-indifferentiable from a random function F = (F n ), F n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . By Theorem 3, C E is also correlation intractable with respect to the random function F . Now consider the primitive G = (G n ) where
Let R be be a relation evasive with respect to the ideal primitive G. Clearly, R is also evasive with respect to the random function F so that C E is also correlation intractable with respect to G. However, C E is not seq-indifferentiable from G. Indeed, consider a distinguisher which simply makes the query 0 n to its left oracle: the answer will be 0 n when it is G, and will be 0 n with only negligible probability when it is C E (since otherwise this would yield a sequential distinguisher distinguishing C E from F ).
E Implications for Chosen-Key and Known-Key Attacks on Block Ciphers
Knudsen and Rijmen [KR07] have introduced the model of known-key attacks on block ciphers, where the attacker is given a random or chosen key K to the block cipher, and must find inputs to the block cipher that together with their image satisfy a relation that would be hard to satisfy for a random invertible permutation. In other words, the attacker must break the correlation intractability of the block cipher for that particular key.
In the random oracle model, there are at least two straightforward ways to obtain a block cipher with a Feistel construction. The first one is to let round functions have input length +n, where is the key length, and to prepend the key K to the input of each round function. Another way is to xor keys (k 1 , . . . , k r ) (where |k i | = n) to the input of the r round functions (F 1 , . . . , F r ) (the pseudorandomness of this construction in the random oracle model has for example been studied by [GR04] ). Many variations can be explored, e.g. having a single round function F instead of independent ones, having F i 's be random invertible permutations rather that random functions, etc.
An interesting result of [KR07] is that for a 7-round Feistel construction using a single random invertible permutation P as round function, and independent keys (k 1 , . . . , k 7 ) xored to the input of P at each round, then the resulting block cipher is not correlation intractable (even when the keys are only random and known from the attacker, not chosen): namely with high probability on the choice of the keys, the attacker can find inputs (L, R) and (L , R ) that together with the corresponding outputs (S, T ) and (S , T ) satisfy R ⊕ R ⊕ T ⊕ T = 0.
Our results on the correlation intractability of the 6-round Feistel construction shows that the block cipher obtained by prepending the key to the input of each round function is correlation intractable (in the random oracle model), and hence immune to known-key and even chosen-key attacks. Other variations need more careful analysis. In particular, note that the variant using a single round function is clearly not immune to known or chosen key attacks (at least when the same key is used at each round): for example for any number of rounds, Ψ
(this is in fact true for any palindromic sequence of round functions).
F Seq-Indifferentiability Beyond the Birthday Barrier for the Construction of [CDMS10]
Coron et al. [CDMS10] considered the 3-round permutation Ψ 3 : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n defined as follows (see Figure 6 for an illustration), given block ciphers E 1 , E 2 and E 3 with n-bit key (first variable) and n-bit input/output (second variable):
The 3 round block cipher Ψ 3 : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n is defined as follows, given block ciphers E 1 , E 2 and E 3 with (k + n)-bit key and n-bit input/output:
We now state our main result in this section: the 3-round Feistel construction ({0, 1}
2n → {0, 1} 2n ) is seq-indifferentiable from a random permutation up to q 2 n queries. To get an ideal cipher, it suffices to prepend a key K to the 3 ideal ciphers E 1 , E 2 and E 3 ; one then gets a family of independent random permutation, parametrized by K, i.e. an ideal cipher. We only consider the 3-round permutation Ψ 3 . The extension to block-cipher Ψ 3 is straightforward. We must construct a simulator S such that the two systems formed by (Ψ 3 , E) and (P, S) are indistinguishable.
Our simulator maintains a history of already answered queries for E 1 , E 2 and E 3 . Formally, (1, R, L, X) exists in history if and only if the simulator has answered E 1 (R, L) query as X or E −1 1 (R, X) query as L previously. Similar conditions hold for (2, X, R, S) and (3, S, X, T ) as well. We define the following algorithms:
where B is the set of already defined values for E 1 (R, ·). Algorithms GuessE The distinguisher's queries are answered as follows by the simulator:
For a given set of queries Q and their responses X (Q) we define the extender consistency as the property that the responses to Ψ 3 (or P ) are equal to those that one would obtain by applying the extender construction from responses to E (or S) (when queries to E or S suffice to preform the calculation). By construction, the system (Ψ 3 , E) always gives consistent response. Also from the definition of our simulator S, it is evident that (P, S) gives consistent responses as well (S runs in polynomial time unless it enters an exponential loop with a small probability). For any distinguisher D against the systems (Ψ 3 , E) and (P, S) we construct another distinguisher D by the following way. 
Moreover, D only makes queries to E or S.
Remark 4.
The above theorem is not true in case of general indifferentiability, this kind of query replacement would mean the simulator is getting some extra information, namely the queries to the P oracle.
For any distinguisher D making only E or S queries we construct another distinguisher D by the following way.
2 (X, S) are processed essentially symmetrically. 5. D does not make any duplicate or trivial query. (Queries which try to verify whether E i is a well defined permutation are trivial queries).
In general, D always observes the exact same or more information than D . It might happen that for some (L, R, S,
query, whereas D finds it through E −1 3 (S, T ) query or vice-versa. When the distinguishers are interacting with (Ψ 3 , E) the X value is always the same irrespective of whether it is retrieved through
query. And when the distinguishers are interacting with (P, S), X follows the exact same probability distribution in both scenarios. This is due to the fact that, for fixed (L, R, S, T ) while
Theorem 6. For any distinguisher D and the distinguishers D and D (making only E or S queries) constructed in the above way, we have
Moreover, if D makes at mostueries to the systems (Ψ 3 , E) or (P, S), then D only makes at most q many 3-query sequences to (Ψ 3 , E) or (P, S). Each query sequence is one of the following types. 
We know, Adv
. Hence Theorem 6, Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 together complete the proof of Theorem 4.
F.1 Proof of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8
Input-ouput of each 3-query sequence made by D is actually a 5-tuple (L, R, X, S, T ). In fact, input of each 3-query sequence is a 2-tuple and output is a 3-tuple. Say before (i + 1) th query, D has observed i many such distinct (as D does not make duplicate or trivial queries) 5-tuples (L j , R j , X j , S j , T j ) for j = 1 to i. When D is interacting with (P, S), the simulator's internal history also contains exactly the same information. Let L, R, X, S and T be the set of L j 's, R j 's, X j 's, S j 's and T j 's (for j = 1 to i) respectively. We partition the set L as
such that ∈ L k if and only if has appeared exactly k times in history (or there are exactly k-many j values such that = L j ). We do similar partitioning for the sets R, X, S and T as well. Note,
We also define L 0 = Y \ L. R 0 , X 0 , S 0 and T 0 are defined similarly. The proofs of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 are essentially independent. We describe Theorem 8 before, because the proof is simpler.
Theorem 8
We prove the result when the query sequence is of Type II. For Type IV query sequence the result follows because of symmetry. Let (R, X) be the input to the Type II query sequence. Note, we can not
and (L P , S P , T P ) be the random variables corresponding to the output tuple depending on whether D is interacting with (Ψ 3 , E) or (P, S) respectively. Let B L be the set of values for which E 1 (R, .) is defined in history. Also on B S , E −1
, we have
OP ST be the set of (S j , T j ) tuples present in history. Also for j = 1, · · · , i, (S j , T j )'s are actually distinct. In other words, |OP ST | = i.
For the tuples (L, S, T ) not covered by Lemma
is actually uniform over the same set, and at other points it has zero probability as well. Using some basic counting principles, we also get
Formally, we have the following lemma.
Proof. For a Type II query sequence the simulator response is decided by simulators behavior on E −1
is not passed to ConflictE 2 and ConflictE 3 functions. L, is only used as input to P . P being a random permutation the probability distributions of L P and (S P , T P ) are actually independent. Again, due to uniform randomness of P , (S P , T P ) is actually uniform over a set of possible values which does conflict with history. Again, the probability that Check(L, R, X) returns Err is the same for all possible outputs of GuessE −1
1 . Also GuessE −1 1 outputs uniformly. Hence, the distribution of L E is also uniform. The result follows, because joint probability distribution of two uniform and independent distribution is also uniform.
is nothing but sum of half of the probability differences of (L E , S E , T E ) and (L P , S P , T P ) at all points. Instead of considering all the points we can only consider the points where the probability corresponding to (L P , S P , T P ) is bigger. Now let us calculate the probability differences.
-As, i ≤ |Y|/2 and i 1 ≤ i the expression above is bigger than zero for j ≥ 1.
-Also, j j |B S ∩ S j | ≤ j j |S j | ≤ i. Hence the expression above is negative for j = 0.
So, we can only consider j = 0, for calculating Adv 
(As, i ≤ |Y|/2 − 1)
Theorem 7
We prove the result when the query sequence is of Type I. For Type III query sequence the result follows because of symmetry. Let (L, R) be the input to the Type I query sequence. Note, we can not have (L, R) = (L j , R j ) for some j ∈ [1, i], because then E 1 (R, L) becomes duplicate or trivial query.
(X E , S E , T E ) and (X P , S P , T P ) be the random variables corresponding to the output tuple depending on whether D is interacting with (Ψ 3 , E) or (P, S) respectively.
As before, B X is the set of values for which E −1 1 (R, .) is already defined in history. Let us assume R ∈ R i1 . We have |B X | = i 1 and B X ⊆ X.
We also partition the sets S j 's as follows. OP XS be the set of (X j , S j ) tuples present in history. We have,
OP ST is defined as before. Let, us denote |X k ∩ B X | as r k . Note, Proof. For a Type I query sequence the simulator response is decided by simulators behavior on E 1 (R, L) query. (S, T ) values return by the simulator is actually direct output of P . Hence, the distribution of (S E , T E ) is independent of internal random choices of the simulator. If we fix S then the distribution of X E is actually uniform over the values for which E −1 1 (R, .) and E 3 (S, .) is not defined. (Note, we can actually drop the ConflictE 2 call inside Check(L, R, X) function when it is being called from E 1 ).
Note, both (X E , S E , T E ) and (X P , S P , T P ) has non-zero probabilities over same set of points (this is a consequence of our simulator being always consistent to P , and never aborting), although they are not the same. Adv D i+1 is nothing but half of sum of the probability differences of the two distributions over all points. The distribution of (X E , S E , T ) does not depend on j , where as the distribution of (X P , S P , T P ) does not depend on k. To give an upper bound for the sum of probability differences we divide the total probability space in four parts. Then, we give an upper bound for each part separately.
1. ∆ 00 is the sum of probability differences for the points, where j = 0 and k = 0. Formally, 
. 
Observe,
